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Introduction
Peggy DesAutels and Joanne Waugh

We offer this volume as a contributio n to the ongoing conversa tion th at goes
under the name of "feminist ethics." This conversation took an exciting and
inte resting turn recently at the Feminist Ethi cs Revisited Conference; many of
1
the essays in this volume articulate ideas and analyses first prese nted there.
The term feminist ethics was used broa dl y at this conference- as it is again
here-to refe r to the perspectives on women 's experience that come into
view at the intersections of ethics, politi cs, philosophy, and literature . Earlie r
generations o f philosoph ers-both male and female-have fo und that the
experiences of women fit neithe r eas ily nor neatly into the ca tegories favored by trad itional, mainstream philosophy. That the dominant discourse of
philosophy still strains to accommodate wome n's experiences has prompted
fe minist ph ilosophers to go beyond the usual boundaries, esp eciall y in
ethics. In her contribution to this volume, "Seeing Power in Morality: A Proposa l for Feminist Naturalism in Ethics," Margaret Urban Walker succinctly
summarizes feminists' achievements in e thics. "Feminist ethiCS, " Walker
w rites, "is inevitably, and fundame ntally, a discourse about morality and
power" (4). Our volume emphasizes this essential insight of fe minist ethics.
Philosophica l e thics typically neglects power, taking its subject to be the
ideal or transcendent nature of morality-something finer and higher than
mere p ower. When attention is paid to questions of power, it is typica lly seen
as standing in opposition to morality. Walker decries this neglect and denies
this opposition at the same time that she insists that the concept of morality
should be neithe r reduced to power no r eli minated in its favo r. Wa lke r insists
on the importance of morality for challenging the legitimacy of dist.ributions
of power, fo r those w ho are powe rless have ne ithe r gro unds nor mea ns for
ix
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challenging existing p ower relations without appea ling to morali ty. Indeed ,
this is one reason why feminist moral discourse asks whether and how
power is distributed equally and unequally, whe the r and how it ga ins legitimacy or sustains itself illegitimately, and whether and when people having
power over others is, in Walker's words, "mo rally necessary, arbitralY, or catastrophic" (5), To answe r su ch qu estions Walker suggests that we recognize
that morality "is a disposition o/pOWe1'S tbmugb a n arrangement oJ resp on sibilities," that these responsibilities and powers are both social and distinctively moral, and that they are no less "natural" for being either or both (6) .
Indeed , such powers and responsibilities are "natural" because they a re necessalY in order for human societies to fun cti on, and human life naturally p erpetuates itself through human societies.
Moral concepts can be abstracted from social practices only at the risk of
missing the part of their meaning-typically the largest part- that is embedded in the social practices that gene rate the conce pts. This is not to den y the
moral authority of morality; rather, it is to insist that there is a specifically
moral understanding of social practices, an unde rstanding that we might, following Walker, call the moral structure of these practices. Walker sees this
moral structure in practices of responsibility; and with the understanding of
responsibility comes the understanding of agency and the values, positive
and negative, that attach to those agents to w hom we differe nti ally ascribe
responsibility. It is our understanding of these practices and the concep ts
embedded in them that grounds the trust that is recognized in the velY n otion of the moral authority of morality . Of course, these practices may be sustained by powe r and authority that is not moral, a fact that is often more
transparent to those who have a lesser share of power and resp onsibility and
are accordingly valued-or devalued- by those with a greater sh are .
Walker provides an example of how a concept like the social co ntract-as
a contract between equals-when analyzed in terms of the social practices
that make sense of it, defines itself in terms of the powers that white male
equals have ove1' those who are neither male nor white and thu s are not
2
equals. As Walker puts it, "Equals do not just have different and grea ter
powers and entitlements relative to those below: they are defined as equal
by their shared entitlements to and powers over those below" (1 2) . Indeed , /
the logic of equality that allegedly stru ctures the Enlightenment project of
moral universalism may also be what renders the project impossible . There
is still another problem with this project of building an ethics and p olities on
consensual equ ality, for as feminist philosophers have insisted , within the
scope of Our moral concern we find those who are not equal because of their
immaturity, disability, incapacity, vulnerability, and dep endence. Such inequality, as Walker notes, describes or will describe all of us at some point
in our lives-whatever our rational agency at this time . Questions about our
responsibilities to those with whom we have unequal p ower relatio nships
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thus move us to undertake political a nalyses that invoke concepts othe r than
a social co ntract between and among equa ls, ana lyses in which questions
must be asked about the exercise of power, the same qu estions that those
working in feminist ethics ask.
These politica l analyses also provide us with occasions on w hich to develop the solidarity necessary for feminist politiCS and ethi CS, as Uma
Narayan suggests in "The Scope of Our Concerns: Reflections o n 'Woman ' as
the Subject of Feminist Politics." Such occasions for deve lop ing solid arity are
crucial in Na raya n's analys is beca use she find s the suggestion that fe minist
politiCS groups togethe r all experie nces of those who ide ntify th emselves as
women to be a nonstarte r. Indeed, Narayan takes this to be the question that
curre ntly faces feminist ethics: "Ca n the scope of feminist analyses, and the
agend a of feminist mo ral and political e ngagement, be justifi ably restricted
to 'issues pertaining to the interests of wome n'I" (15). That feminist politiCS
should take its project as fighting for the interests of all women had been the
conclusion of radical feminists , w ho took "women" as the name of a group
whose members had been syste matica lly oppresse 1 because they were
women. But the analyses presented by radica l feminists were the mselves
contested by poor women, women of color, and women of diffe ring sexual
orientation(s) as not taking their experiences into account. One response to
these objections, w hich Narayan labels the "Differences Critique," is to include the interests of these neglected groups, expa nding the view of
women 's interests to form what Na rayan calls the "Jigsaw Puzzle Picture
Model of Women 's Interests." But if all of women's interests do not fit togeth er as this model suggests, then fe minist politicS (a nd feminist ethics) may
not enta il advanCing the interests of all women. What should drive feminist
politics and feminist ethiCS, Narayan suggests, is so lida rity based on shared
p olitical analyses and not necessa ril y the expe rie nce of being o ppressed by
patriarchy. Solidarity based on shared po litics ca n lead to privileged
women-and men-working against their own privileged intere ts and with
and for women whose oppression results from some combinatio n of gender,
race, class, and sexual orientation. Gender is not me rely added to these other
facto rs; the releva nt metaphor for this combinatio n is chemical, not mechanical. Because one cannot cut off the effects of gen l.e r from those of race,
class, and sexuality, Naraya n suggests that the "Oppressed Ide ntity-Based
Cuto ff Model" of political membership may deprive feminists of theoretical
insights and practica l stra tegies fo r dea ling w ith oppression.
Questions about how analyses of inequality and oppr ssion affect conceptions of agency have received a good deal of attention from feminist
philosophers, and there has been some concern that the very notion of
agency as it has been formulated in traditiona l ethics is fata lly compromised
insofar as it assumes, first, that moral agents are equal in power(s) and , second, that autonomy should be identified with those who are depended on
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rather than dep endent. Not only is this notion of the eq uality of moral agents
defined, as Walker obselves, in te rms of their sharing entitlements to and
pow ers over unequals, the concepts of dependence and independence invoked in such a notion themselves depe nd on d istinguishing-artificiallybetween the public and the private spheres and on identifying morality with
public behavior. Feminist ethics is left w ith a host of problems to add ress, not
the least of them being whe ther and how moral damage is done to oppressed people by diminishing their conception of themselves as mo ral
agents. Especially pressing a re questions of how the concept of mora l
agency may be admitted into feminist ethics: What formulation(s) and what
metaphors are and should be Ll sed to introdu ce the concept? And how w ill
certain formulations and metaphors affect the mo ral structure(s) of the social
practices of which they are a part?
Diana Tietjens Meyers takes up the question of how social categories of
gender affect women 's conceptions of themselves in "Social Groups and Individual Identities-Individuality, Agency, and Th eOly." Meyers argu es for a
conception of identity that recognizes the pow er that social constructs of
gender exercise in individual identity, despite individual cho ice. The conflict
that may ensue between a socially mandated conception of identity, in
w hich one is a member of a subordinated group, and a sense of a self that
belies this social identification may result in a sense of alien atio n, but it is a
sense of alienation that Meyers regards as desirable insofa r as it provokes
moral reflection and e mancipatory social criticism. Reflection on the ways in
which gender identities do and do not affect an individual's sense of pe rsonal identity makes an individual self-conscious in a way that enables social critiqu e . That some feminists have rejected theories of gender because
they seem incompatible with individualized identities res ults, Meyers suggests, from a tende ncy to see gender theories as essentialist, tb at is, as conforming to a social-scientific epistemic model based on inductive gene ralizations about women. As universal generalizations abo ut women, gender
theories are easily disconfirmed by empirica l data, despite the fac t that elements of these theories resonate with the experiences of many women. Inspired by Marilyn Frye's suggestion that we regard gender theories as
metaphors that provide insight and understanding witho ut asse rting ide ntity
or equivalence between things,3 Meyers suggests that we can do justice to
gender theories that, in turn, do justice to some women 's expe rience by
viewing them as we do literary texts. Ju st as interpretations of literalY texts
seek support in passages from the texts and address seeming in consistencies
between the interpretation and other parts of the text, theories of how social
constructions of gender affect individual identity provide diffe rent p ersp ectives on the ways in which gender-as well as class, race, and sexuality-is
constitutive of an identity that is nonetheless p ersonal and individua l. In
reading gender theories of ide ntity describing other socially subordinated
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grou ps as we would literary texts, we must pay attention to the rhetorical
va lue of th e universalist tone of these theories, fo r this tone functions in a
way similar to hyperbole and shouting: it quells disagreeme nt and dissent.
The goa l, then, must be to generate theories of gender-and social practices
that employ them- that allow members of subordinated groups to find their
voices.
In "Identity and Free Agency," Hilde Lindemann Nelson looks at the
power that some texts-ones she refers to as master narratives-have in
structuring the identities of me mbers of oppressed groups and how they may
find their voices through counterstories. Drawing on narratives fro m nurses,
Nelson illustrates how "a powerful group's misperception of an oppressed
group results in d isrespectful treatment that, as in the case of the nurses, can
impede group members in cany ing out their responsibilities" (50). These
master narratives are morally oppressive to members of subordinated
groups insofar as their capacity for normative competence is denied or diminished by the narratives. Nonnative competence entails not only that one
is able to understand moral norms and act accordingly but also that one is
capable of normative seif-disclosure--that one may "reveal who one is,
morally spea king, through what one does" (55).
Revealing oneself as a moral agent is a complex affair. One must see oneself as a moral agent, as morally trustworthy. But, if one sees oneself as a
moral agen t, this requ ires, in turn , that othel''S see her as a moral agent and
understand her action not only as a moral action but also as a moral action
of a specific kind. Thus is a person's identity a function of how others understand w hat she does, as well as how she understands w hat she does, and
thus is free agency a function not only of an agent's capacities and abilities
but also of how others view her capacities and abilities. How others see her
contributes to her understanding of herself-of what she can and should do.
This gives others power to harm a person by depriving her of the identity of
a morally competent agent-what Nelson calls "the harm of deprivati on of
oppo rtunity"-and , in so dOing, by contributing to he r own sense of herself
as having limited or diminished moral agency-what Nelson ca lls "the harm
of infiltrated consciousness." In some cases, such as that involving the narratives of the nurses cited by Nelson, this harm can be repaired by mea ns of
a counterstolY that aims at changing not only the perception that the powerful have of the oppressed group but also an oppressed person's perceptio n of herself.
But such harm is a function not just of the means used but also of the extent to which the identities of the oppressed have been structured by these
maste r narratives. Depending, as Nelson says, on not just how but also when
a counterstory is introdu ced, it mayor may not be possible to repair the harm
of infiltrated consciousness or, at least, to right the wrong done to those
w hose sense of self has been undermined by op pression. Nelson cites as a n
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example of someone with an identity beyond narrative re pair a person who
has never formed any notion of he r free agency beca use of oppressive social
stru ctures combined w ith personal domination in an intimate relationship .
Bat-Ami Bar On takes how others view her and how she views he rself as
her starting point in "Violent Bodies." Bar On reco unts how she develop ed
he r violent body first in respo nse to the taunts of othe r childre n, then in accordance with the customs and expectations of a Jewish- Israeli youth in
postindepende nce Israel, then as an adult Israeli citizen in military service,
and finally as a fe minist involved in a women 's antirape moveme nt in th e
United States. Feminist suspicions and criticisms of violent bodies are
grounded in the fact that it is the male vio lent body that is so often the means
through which women experience vio lence, prima rily in the fo rm of ra pe
and battery in their eve ryday lives and during wartime . But w hat, Bar On
asks, are the ethica l implications of her "violent body"-a body that is ready
to fight and habituated to resp ond to violence w ith violence with little or no
conscious reflection about this response? To fra me her analysis Ba r On turns
to Hannah Arendt, whose work on violence is perhaps the most sustained
thinking about violence undertaken by a fe male philosopher-or a male
philosopher, for that matter. 4 For Arendt, violent action can o nly be justified
on ethico-political grounds, and because, as Bar On points out, we are limited in our ability to predict and control w hethe r any action, including a violent one, will achieve the end for which it is the means, violent actions mu st
be limited in scope and can be justified only for the short term. (Violence in
self-defense is unproblematic because the danger is clear and present and
the end justifying the means is immediate.) Political ends can thus justify instrumental viole nce and instruments like viole nt bodies, as long as violence
is being used to halt-and not to p romote-the decline qf p olitical p ower. Viole nce must always be backed by and restrained by political power, that is,
the conscious and concerted action of a gro up of people working together
not out of self-interest but o ut of solidarity- out of care and co ncern for one
another and the world.
This Arendtean sense of p olitical differs from standard feminist usage in
w hich violence against w ome n is political because it is made possible by a
systemic matrix of domination and submission. For Arendt, systemic domination does not deserve the appellation p olitical because people working together in concert and solidarity are central to her meaning of the term. Bar
On observes that, pace Arendt, w ho objected to feminism insofar as it was
motivated only by women's self- interest and not by care for the world,
women's self-defense can be seen as a political project in an Arendtean understanding of the te rm, as can the production of violent female bodies. Because women's project of producing vio lent bodies serves as an "interruption of the status qu o . . . w hat otherwise would have proceeded
automatically" (71), Bar On argues that the p roduction of women 's vio lent
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bodies is transgressive. As transgress ive, Bar On considers it justified ethicopolitically-as lo ng as women do not transgress boundaries "inhumanely"
and "destructively" and rema in aware of, and wary about, the seductive nature of violence (71).
That feminist ethics develops a theoretical framework and political strategies to contest the exercise of oppressive power is also of concern to Lisa
Tessman , Margaret A. McLaren, Ba rbara S. Andrew, and Nancy Potter, each
of whom analyzes how virtues of character and their realization in habituated actions contribute to these projects. Using a critical virtue ethics framework, Lisa Tessman argues that what is morally objectionabl e about oppression is that it interfe res with human flourishing and that it does so for
targeted social groups in a systematic way. OppreSSion does this by preventing or restricting access to "external goods" but also by preventing or
hindering one in the development and exercise of the virtues a nd , in so doing, precluding one from acquiring a character that is part of a good life . Of
particular concern to Tessman is that we examine how moral damage hinders members of op pressed groups from effectively resisting their oppressio n at the same time as we avoid dehumanizing the morally damaged group
by treating that group as "a p roblem. "
Analyzing how oppressive forces can interfere with human flourishing requires not only that we augment Aristotle'S list of the factors interfering with
fl ourishing by noting the systematic nature of this interference. We must also
add goods that Aristotle did not recognize, including goods that are not captured under distributive paradigms. Of primaJy importa nce to Aristotle, of
course, is the acquisition of those virtu es the exercise of which results in a
good life. Tessman adds the accompa nying realization that if "there is injustice already at work in the formation of character, the fact that something is
based on character does not imply that it is not also rooted in an oppressive
social system" (82). The task-as Tessman, echOing Claudia Ca rd, reminds
uss- is that of distinguishing the insights of the oppressed from the moral
damage that results from oppressio n. Such damage would include the failure
to develop self-esteem, the fear of being conspicuous, and the tendencies to
dissemble and to ingratiate oneself or identify w ith one's oppressors. Such
character traits typically develop as sUlv iva l mechanisms when one lives under conditions of oppression, but this does not mean that they are not morally
damaging as well. Indeed, some psychological traits are doubly damaging
from a moral perspective insofar as they help to convince the members of the
oppressed grou ps that their circumstances are the result not of systemic structures and forces but of their own flawed characters and psyches.
To acknowledge that some of us have the bad "moral lu ck" to be members of oppressed gro ups does not, however, re lieve us of all mo ral responsibility fo r our characte rs, even if th eir formation does not lie comple te ly w ithin o ur co ntrol. There is, of course, conside ra ble risk of harm

/

xvi

DesAutels and Waugh

to membe rs of oppressed gro ups in speaking of moral damage . Tessman
illustrates this risk in recounting how the concept of the "da maged black
psyche" became the justifi cation for opposing changes in oppressive social structures and forces. This argument proceeds from the ass umption
that once the psychic damage has been done , the repai r needed sh o uld
come from neithe r economic ass istance nor political empowerment but,
rather, from the inculcation of "character-building" values , usually conce ived of as "family valu es" where the heads of h o useh old are male. Indeed, an extreme version of this argume nt reverses the causa l sequence,
arguing that character deficiencies are the ca use and not the consequence
of such economic states as welfare dependency, despite the fact that historically economic opportunities for blacks have been so seve rely restricted, e ithe r in the number of opportunities or in the amo unt of compensation , as to be at times virtually nonexistent. Acknowledging tha t talk
of moral damage is risky, Tessman points out that on e does not have to
choose between working to change stru ctu ral causes of oppression and
attempting to repair moral damage. Even more importantly , sh e suggests
that changes in systemic structures and forces while necessary to undo the
oppression of social groups may not be sufficient to repair the moral damage that is part of their oppression. Tessman thus proposes that radica l
strategies of resistance to oppression include a critical virtue ethics, for,
among other things, the moral damage done to members of oppressed
gro ups may interfere w ith their abilities to form su ch strategies of resistance . Equally important, those w ho have been morally damaged because
of oppression have "responsibilities of their own," Card has observed, "to
their p eers and descendants."6
In "Feminist Ethics: Care as a Virtue," Margaret McLaren provides an example of how a traditionally female trait such as caring can be a resource for
a feminist ethics that bases its approach in critical virtue theory. The concept
of care is problematic for feminist ethics beca use some theorists have argued
that defining care as characteristic of women and other subordinated groupS
is instrumental in their oppression. Such definitions can serve to "naturalize"
and perpetuate oppression and can be morally damaging to the extent that
women sacrifice their own interests for the interests of others, including
those of their o ppressors. In so doing, women fail to develop their own identity , autonomy, resources, and moral agency. However, other theorists have
considered care to be a female trait that provides a foundation for a fe minist
ethics. McLaren argues that care ethics of the sort inspired by tlle work of
Carol Gilligan is a f em.inine but not a fem.inist ethics because, among other
things, it reinscribes the stereotypes of women that have stru ctured and pe rpetuated the oppression of women. Still, McLaren insists that the con cepts
developed by feminist philosophers in response to care ethics provide us
with the resources we need for a feminist virtu e ethics.
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That care has been seen as a virtue of women rather than of men is prima
facie problematic, for seeing virtues as gender related has been one way in
which ethical theolY has contributed to and perpetuated oppression. Beca use virtue ethics is not innocent in the matter of women 's oppression does
not mean, however, that it has nothing to offer to feminist ethics. McLaren,
like Tessman, believes that a critical virtue theory has much to recommend
it as a normative ethical theOlY, for, unlike deontological theories, virtue
ethics assumes that the moral agent is an embodied member of a community
and, in so dOing, addresses what is concrete and particular in moral situ ations. This becomes especially clear once we consider the attention that
virtue theolY pays to the contributions of character, practical judgment, emotions, and moral perception in deliberating about actions and motives.
Virtue ethics holds that human flourishing-and how one's community
contributes or does not contribute to such flourishing-is both a condition
for and a conseq uence of a moral life. Following Joan Tronto, McLaren argues that the concept of care should be extended into the political realm
w ith the consequence that the boundary between morality and politics-or
the public and the private-is erased 7 When this boundalY goes, so should
the notion that women's virtues are those of the domestic sphere in contrast
to those virtues (which, if not feminine, are presumably masculine) that allow the formulation of abstract, "universa l," moral principles-principles
that appear to be universal only in the public, and not the private, sphere. Finally, conceiving of care as a public or political virtue incorporates a concern
for justice-the concern that care ethics alleged ly slights. A feminist ethics
that conceives of care as a political virtue will be a virtue ethics informed by
feminist politics but not one in which care is the only virtue. McLaren suggests that other virtues in a feminist virtue theory wou ld include such things
as feistiness and playfulness, in addition to more readily recognized virtues
o f self-respect, openness, courage, and self-awareness.
The importance of contesting the image of the eth ical woman as caring
to the extent of being the "Angel in the House" prompts Barbara Andrew
to look for another image of the eth ical woman in "Angels, Rubbish Collectors, and Pursuers of Erotic Joy: The Image of the Ethical Woman. "8 Like
McLaren, Andrew insists that the virtue of care should not be unde rstood
as exemplifi ed primarily or solely by the domestic nurturer a nd proposes
instead th at we take seriou sly Michel Foucault's claim that ethics has its
origins in "the ca re of the self. "9 As Foucault und erstands it, such care aims
at a telos-"the kind of being to which we aspire w hen we behave in a
moral way"-and thus does Andrew seek the telos of feminist ethics-the
id eal image of the moral agent that inspires the ethical se lf to action. Andrew holds , as do Tessman and McLaren , that feminist moral action is political action and that care properly und erstood neglects neither the moral
autonomy necessary for political action nor justice as both a means and an
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end of political action. Indeed , it is Andrew's cla im that the ideal of e thical relationship that ca re ethics has helped to formulate necessarily involves autonomy and that the recognitio n of this ideal p rovides care ethics
with an alte rnative telos to that of the Angel in th e House . According to
Andrew , the notion of e thical relationship ful fills the same fun ction in care
ethics that the notion of autonomy does in ethical theo ries cente ri ng on
justice: each acts as a condition for moral actions and judgme nts, but each
de pe nds, in turn , on the existe nce of social conditions that prov ide the basic goods that enab le its exercise . Thus, feminist e thics needs a te los th at
incorporates both care and autonomy.
The ideal image(s) of the ethical woman must recognize the importance of
our desires both for connection with others and fo r autonomy; this is not accomplished by bifurcating between the (good) image of the Angel in the
House and the (bad) image of the "Woman of the Streets." Following a suggestion of Drucilla Cornell's,1O Andrew considers the chiffionn ier- the junk
or rubbish collector- as an image of the e thical woman. As a chiffionnie r,
the ethical woman sifts through the remnants of philosophical theories and
systems for usefu l strategies for feminist political and ethical action . As such ,
she gives up the dream of the perfect philosophical system or theory, the one
that will guarantee her neither loss nor oppression, and accepts that she must
improvise strategies that allow her to both engage the other and care for the
self. Still , even this image of the ethical woman lacks an ingredie nt that Andrew thinks is essential to the image of the ethical w oman: the recognition
of the imaginary, the domain in which, as Cornell notes, we as embodied,
sexual creatures imagine ourselves as free and autonomous as we fulfill o ur
desires for ourselves and for others.'! Cornell observes that the imaginary
domain as such can only be accommodated within an abstract ideal of subjectivity: "Defining the pe rson only through a normative outline ... [is) the
only way we can preserv e freedom of the personality."12 In this way we employ the concept of the abstract person in our political analyses as one w ho
determines for herself her values, including how best to love, even though
these values have their source beyond her. In an attempt to do justice to the
imaginary , Andrew turns to Simone de Beauvoir's image of woman as pursuing erotic joy as she creates "found art" and negotiates he r sexual and caring relationships with others in order to experie nce the joys of connection
and of freedom.13 For Beauvoir, the erotic relationship provides the p aradigm of our existence as subjects w ho care for ourselves and connect with
others while also existing as Others for subjects w ho, too, desire both freedom and connection with us. Andrew concludes that w hatever ethical images we propose must acknowledge that we partiCipate w ith each other in
relationships of power.
Nancy Potter also raises a question about our responsibilities to others in
her chapter "Is Refu sing to Forgive a Vice?" Potter agrees w ith Tessman ,
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McLaren, and Andrew that our moral evaluations should take the form not o f
testing w he the r our actions are instances of a universa l moral principle but
of asking w hethe r an action and the disposition to which it attests are deficient or excessive- vi1'tuaus or viciaus--in the context in which they occur.
Potter notes that when moral theorists are asked about forg iveness they are
prone to take the concept out of a religious context but are nonetheless w illing to assert its central p lace in o ur moral lives. Indeed, forgiveness is commonly viewed as moral beca use it indicates that one who has been wronged
has overcome (justifiably) negative feelings toward the person or persons responsible for the harm or injury. These negative feelings include such feelings as resentment, and the presumption is that giving in to such negative
feelings indicates some moral lapse or weakness on the part of the one who
has failed to overcome them. An injured party w ho forgives believes that the
harm or injury perpetu ated by the wrongdoer was morally wrong and that
the w rongdoer is responsible for the action. Nonetheless, the injured party
overcomes negative feelings toward the wrongdoer. In such a view, the act
of forgiveness suggests that the wrongdoer in some sense transcends the
harmful acts committed in the past. Accordingly, some mo ral theorists speak
of the empathy w ith the wrongdoer that allows forgiveness and of the state
of resto ration or reconciliation that is its aim.
But Potter conte nds that this vie w of forgiveness fail s to ta ke into account that when forgiveness is viewed as a virtu e there are situ atio ns in
which its exercise can be seen as an excess or a deficiency. She notes that
Je ffri e Murphy , for example, o bserves that we cannot be o bli gated to forgive another-o r seek restoration or recon ciliation at any cost- if doing
so indica tes that we lack se lf-respect, that we do not count ourse lves as
equal in moral importance to others .1 4 In Murphy's view, fo rgiveness must
be compatible with respect for bo th oneself and othe rs as me mbers of a
moral community. Using this criteri o n, there w ill be cases in whi ch both
the action of forgiving anothe r and the disp ositi on to forgive will count as
vices . Potter finds a case in which forgiveness w ould be a vice in Dorothy
Allison's novel, Bastard Ou t of Ca rolin a 1 5 Bo ne, the protagonist in the
nove l, suffe rs repea ted beatings a t the hands of he r stepfa ther- bea tings
about whi ch he r mother knows and which she some times tri es to help he r
da ughter esca pe . Howeve r, Bone's mother is una ble to choose her daughter's well -being over w hat she perceives as her own-re maining w ith her
hu sband. Th e hu sba nd's ultimatum that his w ife choose him over her
da ughter takes the form o f raping Bone, a rape that Bone's mothe r witnesses . Although Bone's mothe r and stepfathe r-a nd th e large r commu nity of whi ch they are a pa rt-are victims of the o ppression suffe red by
poor whites in Ame rica's rural SOLlth , an oppression that Bon e recognizes
she shares w ith th e membe rs of he r family, Bone refu ses to fo rgive the m
fo r her injuries . As Potte r notes, Bo ne has no reaso n to either forgive o r
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seek a reconciliation w ith her stepfather, w ho scarcely acknowledges h is
wrongdoing or repents fo r it. The re is no positive re latio nship that Bone
can restore w ith him , no point to any reconciliation . He r resentment of he r
mothe r and he r fa ilure to fo rgive her, while clearly pa inful to Bone because she has given up the opportunity to recover her mothe r's love , may
be necessary if Bone is to rea li ze that she has suffe red an inju ry that she
did not dese rve . Thus may Bone 's re fu sal to fo rgive be see n, Potter su ggests, as the mean between excess and deficie ncy, fo r it signals her respect for herse lf-a nd othe rs-as membe rs o f a moral community, as
moral agents w ho have a right to expect that injustice be punished. To refu se to allow a wrong to go unp unished , to refuse to fo rgive w hen to do
so would be to diminish one's moral worth-and the re by co mmit a furthe r
injury and injustice to oneself- can hard ly be co unted as a vice .
In "Gender and Moral Reason ing Revisited: Reengaging Feminist Psychology," Phyllis Rooney argues, too, that feminists should redirect their attention to the situational character of both gende r and moral psychology,
specifically with the aim of e nhancing our understanding of moral reasoning.
Rooney shares the concern expressed by many of the contrib utors to this
volume that, in talk of care and justice as diffe rent voices in moral deliberations, we fail to notice that some of these voices a re the voices of the oppressed. Empirical studies conducted subsequent to those described in Gilligan's In a D~fferent Voice contest the claim that males are more likely than
females to have a disposition for moral rationalism,16 that is, an enthusiasm
for systematizing abstract rules and general p rinciples a nd for seeing the primaty values of mo ral agency as consisting in autonomy, consistency, a nd
control. But the issue-as Rooney insists-is not merely a factu al one, for traditional accounts of moral reasoning have asserted men's superiority as a
sex over women precisely insofar as men have this proclivity toward moral
rationalism and wome n do not. Indeed , the justification that one so often
finds fo r denying women moral rationality is wome n's p resumed inferiority
at reasoning in this f ashion. Thus does Rooney express the same concern as
other contributors that "in the feminist literature there has been an insuf ficient reading against the grain of this traditional supposition" (1 56). She is
especially concerned that the "care voice" attributed to women is characte rized as eschewing abstract principles in favo r of atte nding to the concrete aspects and contextual features of a mo ral situation. Rooney notes the imprecision with w hich abstract is used in such a characterization of the care ethic
and points out that "abstracting from a (multifaceted) moral situation w ith respect to particular kinds of relationships and responsibilities among ind ividuals in it, and not w ith respect to the specific juridical rights of those individu als as autonomous agents, is one way of abstracting fro m the situatio n;
another way involves abstracting with respect to the latte r and not the fo rmer (and these, clearly, need not be the only way of abstracting)" (156- 57).
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Rooney cites the psychological research of the past two decades that contests the view of earlier resea rch, like Gilligan's, according to which gender
consists of more or less stable intrapsychic traits and dispositions. More recent research suggests that gender is also very much a social categoty, one
that social regulation works to produ ce, perpetuate, and reinforce through
gender norms, practices, and expectations that ca n be related to power differentials. Empirical studies suggest that mod ifications of the experime ntal
situation can result in the appearance-or disappea rance-of gende r differences and that the politica l dimension of different research programs may do
so as well . Prompted by the possibility that Gilligan's work "exaggerates d ifferences in disposition between women and men and overlooks diffe rences
in social structure, such as power differentials that press for different behavior in the two sexes," Nancy Clopton and Gwendolyn Sorell have studied the
extent to which gender is stable versus situ ational in instances of moral reasoning.t7 Their conclusion is that gender differences in the orientation of
moral reasoning resu lt more from "differences in current life situation than
from stable gender characte ristics."18 Rooney concludes that their study suggests that if care and justice apply to something, it is "to different kinds of
moral situations in the kinds of responses they evoke" (161) .
Rooney takes this shift to a more situational view of gender in moral reasoning as an impetus toward a more situational view of cognition, but she
stresses that situated reasoning is not th e same thing as contextual reasoning.
"Care reasoning" may be contextual in a way that "justice reasoning" is supposedly not, but both kinds of moral reasoning-indeed, all kinds of moral
reasoning-are situated. If one set of moral reasoners is prone to use "rights
and principles" talk, we need to ask what it is about the situ ation of these
reasoners that constrains them to reason this way. Beca use gender is often a
salie nt characteristic of social loca tio n-one constructed and situ ated
through particular norms and expectations-we may find that the gender of
reasoners affects how they constru ct their "situatedness" and that, in specific
social locations, men and women w ill construct their situ atedness differe ntly.
Of particu lar importance for ethics is that recent psychological work has
given an active ro le to moral situations, prompting Rooney to remark that
"situ ations, thoughtfully encountered , ca n bring morality to people: it is not
simply that people bring morality (in the form of some 'inner' capacities and
virtues , consistent sets of moral principles, and so on) to situations" (164). If
ethicists have failed to recognize the extent to w hich this is tru e, it may be
because the hypothetical situations often described whe n presenting moral
problems are, as Rooney stresses, prese lected for the limited forms of moral
rationa lity they employ. Indeed, the models of cognition that they employ
only sca rcely apply to moral problems as distinct from mathematical or logical ones. Whether the moral situation is found in life or in literature, humans
employ more cognitive and affective capacities than those exhibited in the
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artificial and hypothetical situations of ethica l theory. Rooney asserts that
these cognitive and affective ca pacities, "with moral practice a nd the development of moral integrity, enhance rather than diminish the range of human
reasoning ca pacities" (164) . Her recommendatio n is that feminist theorists
operate w ith a more sophisticated picture of moral reasoning.
James Lindemann Nelson provides a complex p icture of moral reasoning
in his "Constru cting Feelings: Jane Austen a nd Naomi Sche man on the Moral
Role of Emotions." Nelson analyzes the views of moral reaso ning p resented
by certain characte rs in Jane Austen's Sense and Sensibility and uses this
analysis to critique Naomi Schema n's account of the role of emotions in
moral cognition. 19 According to Nelson, Austen is conce rned not merely w ith
how character is developed in the Dashwood daughters but also w ith the
"set of socially created and renewed resources" that contribute to the construction of fee lings, the direction of action, and the intelligibility of the
world. Indeed, that Austen captures the effects that emotions have on moral
reasoning w ith such clarity and elegance is what prompts Nelson to see her
novel as a kind of exercise in moral cognition. Nelson suggests that we might
view Austen herself as refuting the view, exp ressed by the cha racte r of Marianne, that "feelings as such reliably indicate where propriety lies." Nelson's
own view of the emotions' contributions to mora l epistemology is more positive than Austen's, whose p osition in Sense and Sensibility a ppears also to
be at odds with much recent feminist theory devoted to the positive role that
emotions p lay in moral reasoning.
Nelson's take is also at odds with Naomi Scheman's views on the role of
emotion in moral reasoning. Scheman holds that one of the primaly functions of emotions is to provide for the possibility of moral objectivity; emotions are socia ll y constru cted and essential to moral ju Igment. Nelson reads
Scheman as saying that, as a social constru ction, an e motion is not a sta te of
an individu al and does not have the kind of causal relations that provide for
its existence as an entity independent of a social context. In Scheman's view,
one could not expe rience an emotion outside of a social context that relates
feelings, sensations, thoughts, and behavior in ways that provide for a cohere nt explanation; or, as Nelson observes, "Scheman's view ... entails that
emotions are not identifiable in terms of their causal effectiveness outside of
particular fo rms of social practices and explanations" (169).
For Nelson, the ontological status of emotions-whethe r they exist as
functions of explanatOlY schemes o r whether they can be individuated apart
from their role in social explanations-has important conseque nces for
moral reasoning. He finds Scheman's account unclear regarding th conative
or representational force of emotions-a force that he thinks is especially important w hen an e motion is discord ant w ith some of our beliefs. For Nelson,
emotions can and often do reveal what is morally salient in a situation; in
support of this claim he cites Richmond Campbell's analysis of fear as a rep-
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resentation that one is in imminent da nger and Alison Jaggar's account of the
importance of "outlaw emotions."2o The problem Nelson finds with Scheman 's account of the moral role of emotions is that if emotions are functions
of social explanations, the best that o utlaw emotions can do is identify alternative strategies to the dominant stra tegy under w hich these emotions are
deemed "outside of the law." Yet Scheman sees confrontations between explanatory strategies as contributing to the search for moral objectivity; to attain it requi res a set of stable and sharable beliefs to emerge from chall enges
by the w idest possible set of alternatives. Nelson does not see how emotions,
as Scheman chamcten zes them, can contribu te to the resolu tion of these
contests. If emotions only exist w ithin social explanations, can confli cting
emotions indicate anything other than the existence of multi ple explanatory
strategies? Ca n they indicate that one strategy is more morally defensible
than another? Nelson thinks that emotions can represent the world as being
a certa in way beca use they do have causal powers that individuate them independently of an explanatolY scheme . Citing Scheman's discussion of the
disagreement between the mother and son in Torch Song Trilogy as to
whether the on's feelings of loss over his deceased homosexual lover are
analogous to the mother'S feelings of loss fo r her deceased husband, Nelson
observes that there is nothing inferential or interpretative about the son's suffering. The son does not have to determine whether his e motion is located
in an explanatolY scheme, and it is difficulL to believe that his mother would
not recognize it as suffe ring-wheth e r or not it qualified on her sche me as
conjugal grief. Or, as Nelson observes abo ut anger, "social p ractices might affect anger in many ways-trigger it, shape it, control w hat counts as acceptabl e expression of it, associate it a nd the forms of its expression in different
ways according to gender or class-but not by p roviding it with the conditions that are essential to its having its identity at all" (1 79) . He notes, in a
similar vein , that although in Sense a nd Sensibility Marianne and her sister,
Elinor, have different views of the explanatory scheme that holds that "feelings as such reliabl y indicate where propriety lies," Elinor does not deny that
Marianne feels what she feels. Mari anne's defense of her emotions and of
tlleir role in 'her view of propriety suggests tllat Marianne's emotions, pace
Austen, may not have been so unrelia ble after all. Indeed, one might a rgue
that these "outlaw emotions" represented the moral indefensibility of an explanatOlY scheme that causes women to fee l so much shame over having
done so little harm .
In the concluding section of this volume contributors discuss how the insights of feminist ethics can be applied in specific social contexts. Joa n C.
Tronto, whose Moml Bounda1·ies: A Political Argumentfor an Ethic of Care
has influ enced many contemporary theorists-including contributors to this
volume-urges th ose working in profeSSional ethics to follow feminists in
their examination of the mea nings ass igned to moral principles in reflexive
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moral practices. In "Does Managing Professionals Affect Professional Ethics?
Competence, Autonomy, and Care," she examines the claim- frequently
criticized by those w hose job it is to manage professionals-that formulating
and monitoring ethical standards for the professions is prop e rly left to their
practitioners. Professionals defend their right to dev ise their own sta ndards
by appealing to notions of professional autonomy and professional comp etence. More than one feminist theorist has p ointed out the ways in which
professionals tend to cast them elves as autonomous (masculine) fi gures
who are nearly heroic, who have to struggle to maintain their au tonomy
against controlling (feminine) managers w ho resort to manipulation and indirection. Tronto believes that the notion of managing p rofessio nals is ethically dubious, and she thinks that the best way for professionals to make this
case is to extend their idea of competence beyond knowing and applying
technical expertise to include "caring well. " "Caring well" should not be
equ ated with providing a "reasonable standard o f care," w hich is usually understood to be a matter of conforming to a set of technica l requireme nts, for
caring well involves focusing not merely on th e requireme nts of the moment
but on the entire caring process. Accordingly, the competent professionalthe caregiver- must be not only technically competent but also attentive, responsible, and responsive . This will entail , among other things, using "multiple perspectives to make certain that care is not being distorted by relations
of power and imposed or ignored needs" (192).
But professional autonomy, and not just professional competence, needs
to be reconceptualized if one is to find a solution to the problem of regulating professionals other than introducing nonprofessional managers. Tronto
suggests that traditional views of professional autonomy tend to see p rofessio nal practice as consisting of a relationship of only two parties : professio nal and clie nt (patient) . But this picture neglects the extent to w hich professional activities as they are currently carried out involve contri butions
from a number of other professionals. Tronto notes e mpirical studies suggesting that the greater the extent that professionals see tl1emse lves as a team
and to the extent that they are w illing to see each othe rs as equals and to acknowledge their vulnerabilities to other members of the team , the less likely
they will be to find tl1eir work stressful and the more likely the team w ill be
effective. Professionals who see themselves as separated from others w ith
whom they w ork-and from their clients-because of differentials of power,
distance, and professional hierarchies are less likely to communicate and acknowledge the possibility of error. Tronto su ggests that professional competen ce should be understood as a quality exhibited not so much by individuals as by teams or groups of profeSSionals. Professional au tonomy may then
be seen as requiring profeSS ionals to take resp onsibility fo r the orga nizations
of their professions, including the ir relationships w ith other professionals. In
so doing, all professionals need to see the mselves as similar to those o f us in
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society who also give care and notas markedly different from others because
of their professional competence. They need to see professional ethics as not
so different from the ethical responsibilities of people in society generally.
The self-definition of many professionals emphasizes having expert
knowledge-and a "calling"-that differenti ates them from others. Thus do
they claim to be self-regu lating, wrapping themselves, as Tronto says, in their
"cloak of competence" and denying that nonprofessional managers are qualified to challenge their professional judgment. Tronto suggests that professionals are, perhaps, even more concerned than others to assert their autonomy and demand the kind of self-control denied others for fear that their
professions will be seen as like the more "feminine " caring professions.
Given the extent to which contemporalY society seems committed to "flat hierarchies," professionals may worry that their work is being devalued, and
they may feel the need to reassert its value. But defending the value of one's
own profession by devaluing the work of others seems unlikely to be a successful strategy in the long run. As a result, Tronto proposes that the professions give up their claim to a special status based on their posseSSion of expelt knowledge that differentiates them from others. She urges, instead, that
they acknowledge that they are able to care for others as a consequence of
their competence and that caring well requires work ing with other professionals. Finally, she urges them to view caring well as central to the practice
of all professions. They will then hold themselves and others with whom
they work to the same standard as we would hold anyone else in societyto a standard that includes the responsibility to care for others.
Natalie Brender is also concerned with care as an ethical concept in the
public sphere. Brender begins by recounting historical antecedents in which
ethical theorists, usually men, have expressed anxiety about the shortcomings
of those, usually women, who allow emotions or emotional dispositions such
as care to dictate actions and policies in the public realm. Still , care can be a
problematic concept in the political sphere, as Brender notes in her discussion of humanitarian relief. Suffering is prolonged rather than reduced if and
when humanitarian relief permits political power to remain with those who
are responsible for initiating and perpetuating the conditions causing the suffering. Brender argu es that we must cultivate a degree of analytica l detachment when responding to graphic representations of the suffering of those
suffiCiently distant from us that we are unceltain of the suffering's causes and
the consequences of our financia l help. Brender cites Margaret Walker's work
on representational practices and mora l recognition to argue that the "moral
graphics" of many calls for humanitarian relief seem designed to block recognition by the audience that the suffering being represented is occurring in a
specific sociopolitical and economic context. 21 Brender takes Walker's implications to be that "such a failure of recognition is not consequentially but intrinsically ethically deficient" (209) and that "notwithstanding the images'
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success in produ cing a salutalY emotional and practical response, it is
grounds for ethical criticism of the images that they foster a cognitive failure
of recognition" (209) . Brender wants to insist, however, tha t analytical detachment of the kind required to respond ethically to these images is not incompatible with care . Drawing on the work of Joan Tronto, Brender suggests
problematic aspects of Western audience members resp onding to linages of,
say, starving childre n-and "showing that they care"-by w riting checks to
relief agencies. Care, as Tronto has pointed out, diffe rs in terms of its object(s): one can care about someone in the sense of being generally concerned for her well-being and can care jorsomeone, w hich requires attention
to another's needs-physical, emotional, spiritual, intellectual, and psychic. 22
Both of these can be done well or poorly, and to ca re well o ne must have
knowledge about the needs, priorities, and demands of the sp ecific situation
and choose the appropriate course of action using the correct means. Writing
a check to a relief agency is not an instance of caring j or those w ho are suffering. Rather, it indicates that one cares about their suffering, althou gh not
enough to investigate the cause(s) of their suffe ring. It is true that the humanitarian response may be inhibited if emotional appeals are accompanied
by political analysis, but Brender notes that there is also a danger that those
confronted with repeated images will cease to respond altogether. What
makes both compassion and analytic detachment p OSSible-and not inherently incompatible- is the cognitive content as well as the corrigibility of
emotions. Representations that fail to acknowledge these aspects of our emotionallives will, in the final analysis, be shOlt-lived and limited in their effectiveness to provoke responses-humanitarian or othelw ise.
Alison Bailey is also concerned with how feminism can inform analyses of
political and social problems-but in a different context. She is concerned
with how w e conceive of our responsibility for hate crimes in the communities of which we are members. She cites the crimes committed against Bridget Ward, an African American single head of household, after moving to
Bridesburg, a suburban area sometimes characterized as one of "P hiladelphia's best kept secrets." Ward and her family moved o ut of their house in
Bridesburg in less than two months because of repeated threats and acts of
violence against them. Some residents of Bridesburg decried the hate campaign against the Ward family and insisted that they were not racists, that this
campaign was the work of a "few bad apples," and that the community as a
whole did not want to be blamed fo r the acts of violence. In a traditional
view of collective responsibility-what Bailey refers to as the liberal response-a group is assigned responsibility for harms perpetrated by some of
its members and it is the group's resp onsibility to hold the individual p erpetrators accountable for their (past) actions. The focus, as Bailey notes, is "on
the relationships between individuals in groups and the causal contribution
each makes to a particular state of affairs," (221) and the p erspective taken
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on this state of affairs is primarily down and backward, that is, those w ho
neither contributed to nor were the victims o f the harmful act assign resp onsibility to other members of their group for w hat these members have already done. In this view, the residents of Bridesburg are discharging w hatev er resp onsibility they have in condemning the members of their
community w ho performed the acts. Bailey, echoing concerns of other feminists, a rgues that the libe ral account of collective resp onsibility is inadequ ate
in the case of hate crimes. It fails to acknowl edge that the identity of the victim is not incidental to the crime; rather, this individu al was chosen to be the
vi ctim of the crime beca use he or she was a member of a targeted group. As
a result, this concepti on of collective resp onsibility fails to recognize the social and syste mic dimensions of the particular act of violence and thus conceives of respo nsibility too narrowly. "To fully address the harms resulting
from practices such as rape, gay bashing, and racially motivated violence,"
Bailey says, "our notion of resp onsibility must look beyond the moral mome nt of the crime itself" (222). Such crimes are a consequence not only of
isolated intentions and actions of individuals but also of a social system of
oppression, and thus w e must consider the roles that communities play in
keeping in place systems that increase the likelihood of such intentions and
actions.
As part of her analys is, Bailey cites Larry May's work on collective responsibility. May recognizes that the attitudes of a community toward minority groups may increase the odds that hate crimes will occur in a community .23 In May's account of shared resp onsibility, then, membe rs of a
community are held responsible for their attitu des and should look not only
"down and backwa rd " but also forward to changing the shared attitudes that
foster a tolerance of hate crimes in the community. Still , Ba iley worries that
this atte mpt to share responsibility focLlses only on the attitudes, feelings,
and be havior of the majo rity members of the community and not on the minority members who have been the victims of the hate crimes. Bailey wonders how successful this endeavor to change the majority'S attitude toward
the p opulation 's minority members can be if the latte r'S views and experie nces are not taken into consid eration. Indeed , she speculates th at the motivation for preventing any furth er hate crimes from occurring in this community may well be the result of shame rather than genuine concern for the
w ell-being of others. The problem, as Claudia Card has observed, is that
what we see when we look up and fOlward will vaJY w ith our social location 24 If one is "a t home" in one's communi ty, one may have a great dea l of
difficulty not only in understanding why others feel ill at ease but also in
knowing what causes them to have such feelings. Invo king Maria Lugones's
notion of "world traveling,"25 Bailey suggests that we view oppressed members of a society as those who have to world travel out of necess ity in the
hope of escaping their oppression. In so doing, they are forced to travel to
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p laces where they are not "at home" and where even well-meaning othe rs
may see them as outsiders. Those who inhabit positions of privilege travel to
other worlds when, if, and how they choose and are at least predisposed to
feel at ease wherever they are. As long as the "outside rs" remain the subject
of conversation rather than a party to it, those who are privileged are unlikely to have any idea of w hether and how their actions-even wellintentioned ones-contribute to the "outsider" being ill at ease. In place of
May's notion of shared responsibility, Bailey thus proposes a more opene nded account of responsibility in which we see ourselves as "acting with"
rather than "acting for" the victims of hate crimes. In this account of responsibility, we need to ask how a community should respond to prevent future
harmful acts as we ll as past ones. In so doing, we need to include in o ur discussions of responsibility those who have been-and may be-harmed by
hate crimes. Bailey closes by citing the example of Billings, Montana, a community that mobilized itself in the face of a series of hate crimes against
African Americans, Jews, and Native Americans. In this case, various organizations and community members, prompted by the suggestions and support
of community leaders, demonstrated the ir opposition to those who had committed these hate crimes, their SUppOl1 of the victims of the crimes, and their
intention of preventing any such crimes in the future. They engaged in su ch
activities as attending services w ith the victims at their (defaced) church , disp laying menorahs in their windows, and repairing the damaged homes of
the victims. Such acts of solidarity exhibit the kind of collective responsibility that empowers moral communities and their members.
Empowering moral communities and their members must be a goal of ethical theory as long as moral authority and moral responsibility are necessary
for us to survive and flourish. Achieving this end requires an analysis of how
power is implicated in the moral structure of our social practices. In other
words, we must do what feminists who do ethics-especially those in this
volume-have done: see power in morality and morality in power. This is,
we think, no small achievement.

NOTES
1. The Feminist Ethics Revisited Conference was sponsored by the Department of
Philosophy and the Ethics Center of the University of South Florida and took place in
October 1999 in Clearwater, Florida. The palpable excitement of the participants at
this conference was the impetus for us-along wi th Hilde Lindemann Nelson and
Sa ra Ruddick, the editors of the Feminist Constructio ns Series at Rowman and Littlefield-to pursue tile publication of tllis volume. It includes expanded versions of a
number of the papers presented at tile conference and some essays not presented
there. We would like to thank all who contributed to the confe rence and to the volume.
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